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Implicitinrecentschol
-arlydebatesabouttheefªcacyofmethodsofwarfareistheassumptionthat
themosteffectivemeansofwagingpoliticalstruggleentailsviolence.
1Amongpoliticalscientists,theprevailingviewisthatoppositionmovementsselectvi
-olentmethodsbecausesuchmeansaremoreeffectivethannonviolentstrate
-giesatachievingpolicygoals.
2Despitetheseassumptions,from2000to2006
organizedcivilianpopulationssuccessfullyemployednonviolentmethodsin
-WhyCivilResistanceWorks
WhyCivil
ResistanceWorks
Maria J. Stephan andErica ChenowethTheStrategicLogicof
NonviolentConºict
MariaJ.StephanisDirectorofEducationalInitiativesattheInternationalCenteronNonviolentConºict.
EricaChenowethisAssistantProfessorofGovernmentatWesleyanUniversityandaPostdoctoralFellowat
theBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairsintheJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernmentat
HarvardUniversity.
Theauthorsarelistedinrandomorderandcontributedequallytothisarticle.Theauthorswishto
thankPeterAckerman,DouglasBond,JonathanCaverley,HowardClark,AlexanderDownes,Jack
DuVall,RoyEidelson,MatthewFuhrmann,MatthewKroenig,AdriaLawrence,JasonLyall,Brian
Martin,DougMcAdam,AmadoMendoza,HardyMerriman,WendyPearlman,RegineSpector,
MonicaDuffyToft,NedWalker,StephenZunes,theanonymousreviewers,andparticipantsinthe
InternationalSecurityProgramattheBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairsatHar-
vardUniversityforusefulcommentsonpreviousdraftsofthisarticle.ElizabethWellscontributed
helpfulresearchassistance.
1.RobertA.Pape,
DyingtoWin:TheStrategicLogicofSuicideTerror
(NewYork:RandomHouse,
2005);RobertA.Pape,
BombingtoWin:AirPowerandCoercioninWar
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sityPress,1996);DanielL.BymanandMatthewC.Waxman,“KosovoandtheGreatAirPower
Debate,”InternationalSecurity,
Vol.24,No.4(Spring2000),pp.5–38;DanielL.Byman,MatthewC.
Waxman,andEricV.Larson,
AirPowerasaCoerciveInstrument
(Washington,D.C.:RAND,1999);
DanielBymanandMatthewWaxman,
TheDynamicsofCoercion:AmericanForeignPolicyandthe
LimitsofMilitaryMight
(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002);MichaelHorowitzandDan
Reiter,“WhenDoesAerialBombingWork?QuantitativeEmpiricalTests,1917–1999,”
Journalof
ConºictResolution,
Vol.45,No.2(April2001),pp.147–173;MaxAbrahms,“WhyTerrorismDoes
NotWork,”
InternationalSecurity,
Vol.31,No.2(Fall2006),pp.42–78;GaryClydeHufbauer,Jeffrey
J.Schott,andKimberlyAnnElliott,
EconomicSanctionsReconsidered:HistoryandCurrentPolicy
(Washington,D.C.:InstituteofInternationalEconomics,1992);RobertA.Pape,“WhyEconomic
SanctionsDoNotWork,”
InternationalSecurity,
Vol.22,No.2(Fall1997),pp.90–136;LisaL.Mar
-tin,CoerciveCooperation:ExplainingMultilateralSanctions
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1992);JalehDashti-Gibson,PatriciaDavis,andBenjaminRadcliff,“OntheDeterminantsof
theSuccessofEconomicSanctions:AnEmpiricalAnalysis,”
AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,
Vol.41,No.2(April1997),pp.608–618;A.CooperDrury,“Revisiting
EconomicSanctionsRecon
-sidered,
”JournalofPeaceResearch,
Vol.35,No.4(July1998),pp.497–509;IvanArreguín-Toft,
HowtheWeakWinWars:ATheoryofAsymmetricConºict
(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005);
GilMerom,
HowDemocraciesLoseSmallWars:State,Society,andFailuresofFranceinAlgeria,Israelin
Lebanon,andtheUnitedStatesinVietnam
(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003);andDon
-aldStoker,“InsurgenciesRarelyWin—AndIraqWon’tBeAnyDifferent(Maybe),”
ForeignPolicy,
No.158(January/February2007).
2.SeePape,
DyingtoWin;
andArreguín-Toft,
HowtheWeakWinWars.
7InternationalSecurity,
Vol.33,No.1(Summer2008),pp.7–44
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